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Abstract
The Carter years have often been characterized as a period of profound economic malaise 
brought on by weak and misguided leadership. Indeed, not since Herbert Hoover left 
office in 1933 has a president faced such pervasive allegations of economic mismanage-
ment. However, examination of broad indicators of economic conditions demonstrates 
that the economy performed quite well during the Carter years. Moreover, fiscal policy 
during the Carter Administration was relatively stable and less volatile than fiscal policy 
during other postwar presidential periods and appropriate in its countercyclical thrust. In 
contrast, monetary policy was highly erratic compared to monetary policy during other 
presidential terms and represented a destabilizing influence in the late 1970s. 
The “Ranking of Presidents,” according to Clinton Rossiter, “has always been a 
Favorite Indoor Sport of history-minded Americans.”1 An important aspect of rank-
ing the president involves drawing analogies and making, at times, tortuous compar-
isons. While Jimmy Carter has sometimes been compared to fellow Democrat Frank-
lin Roosevelt, more often he has been compared to the only other engineer turned 
president, Herbert Hoover. 
Carter shared Hoover’s disdain for the compromises of politics and thought “pol-
itics was incompatible with good government.”2 Carter and Hoover both distrusted 
strong central government.3 More importantly, however, Hoover and Carter both be-
came associated with economic decline and mismanagement. As Sidney Weintraub 
saw it, Carter was “likely to succeed where all Democrats—and Republicans—have 
failed—namely, in making his own name a synonym for economic mismanagement 
and expunging memories of Herbert Hoover dawdling at the onset of the Great De-
pression.”4 So strong was this comparison that during the second half of his Admin-
istration Carter acquired the unenviable nickname “Jimmy Hoover.”5 
Not since Hoover left office in 1933 has a president faced such pervasive allega-
tions of economic mismanagement. Like Hoover, Carter saw himself as an activist, a 
leader, a problem solver. And like Hoover, Carter was defeated after one term in of-
fice. To be fair, economic circumstances did conspire against Hoover and he did reign 
over the worst economic crisis in our nation’s history. But what about Carter? How 
do the Carter years compare with economic performance throughout the postwar pe-
riod? Was fiscal and monetary policy inappropriate or misguided? How did Carter 
respond to the economic environment facing him in the late 1970s? 
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Economic Performance and the Perception of a Failed Presidency
In the 1970s, structural changes in the U.S. economy conspired to make good eco-
nomic performance an elusive goal. The large influx of workers from 1964 to 1980, a 
result of the postwar baby-boom, made low unemployment difficult to attain while 
increases in world energy prices put upward pressure on inflation. Although these 
pressures affected economic performance throughout the 1970s, the Carter years are 
most generally associated with economic decline. However, recent studies indicate 
that economic performance during the Carter years was not as dismal as our collec-
tive memory might lead us to believe.6 
Economic growth during the Carter years was quite strong. In fact, the average 
growth in real GNP of 3.1 percent during the Carter years was stronger than either 
the Reagan, Eisenhower, Nixon, or Ford years and represented the longest peacetime 
expansion, at that time, in the postwar era. Although the unemployment rate in the 
1970s was higher on average than that which prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
unemployment rate during the Carter years was lower than in either the Ford years 
or the Reagan years. Moreover, the unemployment rate was falling throughout most 
of the Carter years, at least until 1980.7 It is quite true that during the Carter years 
inflation was high—averaging about 8 percent. This rate exceeds the average infla-
tion rate of the 1950s and 1960s as well as the inflation rate during the Reagan years. 
However, the average rate of inflation during the Ford years was higher, averaging 
8.1 percent. Moreover, the rate of inflation was 9 percent on an annual basis for only 
one year during the Carter Administration whereas the rate of inflation was above 9 
percent for two consecutive years during the Ford Administration. 
A ranking of economic performance during seven postwar presidential periods 
on the basis of growth in output and employment, unemployment, inflation and in-
terest rates, productivity, and capital investment shows that the Carter years outper-
formed the Ford, Reagan, and the Nixon years. Only in the Eisenhower years was 
peacetime economic performance better than during the Carter years, and only mar-
ginally so.8 
What appears to have influenced popular perceptions of economic performance 
during the Carter years, however, was the poor performance of the economy in one 
year, 1980. While output expanded each year from 1977 through 1979, real GNP de-
clined at a .2 percent annual rate in 1980. Unemployment, which had fallen through-
out the Carter years from 6.9 percent in 1977 to 5.8 percent in 1979, rose sharply in 
1980 to 7 percent. While inflation rose steadily from 1977 to 1979, oil price increases 
produced a large jump in the inflation rate from 6.9 percent in the fourth quarter 1979 
to 10 percent in the first quarter 1980. 
The poor state of the economy in 1980 undoubtedly contributed to the view, held 
by many, that the Carter years were a period of economic malaise. Although the pres-
ident is not solely in control of the economy and quite often has only minimal influ-
ence over changes in fiscal and monetary policy, the public attributed the economy’s 
poor economic performance to Carter’s weak, misguided leadership. The public’s 
perception of a presidency wrought with indecision was understandable. Carter cam-
paigned in 1976 on a platform to promote growth and reduce unemployment; how-
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ever, growing inflationary pressures subsequently led the President to modify his 
concern for unemployment. The budget deficit of $53.6 billion in 1977 rose slightly in 
1978 to $59.2 billion. In 1979, however, the budget deficit fell to $40.2 billion, reflect-
ing a more contractionary policy stance. As the economy turned downward in 1980, 
the budget deficit swelled to $73.8 billion as Carter publicly supported more expan-
sionary policies. As Erwin Hargrove points out, Carter’s policies “appeared to many 
to be a presidential strategy of zigzag in economic policy. . . .”9 
The increase in the budget deficit in 1980 contributed to another criticism of the 
Carter Administration. Carter took on the hue of a big spending liberal who, rather 
than balancing the budget, reigned over the largest annual peacetime budget deficit 
in U.S. history. In nominal terms, the budget deficit increased by 38 percent in only 
four years. Even in real terms, the budget deficit expanded from $79.6 billion to $86.1 
billion by 1980.10 Although oil price increases in 1979 put significant upward pres-
sure on prices, many associated the rising inflation with the “liberal” policies of the 
Carter Administration. 
Fiscal Policy, Monetary Policy, and the Presidency
Despite appearances, Carter was, from the beginning, a conservative Democrat—
fiscally speaking.11 Throughout his presidency, Carter continually preached the vir-
tues of a balanced budget and warned of the hazards of inflation. Indeed, if we look 
at the budget deficit as an indication of fiscal policy, we can see that, while the budget 
deficit has grown throughout much of the postwar era, the deficit was held in check 
during the Carter years. Comparing the average real budget deficits of postwar Pres-
idents from Eisenhower to Reagan reveals that the budget deficit during the Carter 
years was an average $74.7 billion per year compared to $103.3 billion during the 
Ford years and $153.1 billion during the Reagan years.12 While budget deficits were 
held in check during the Carter years, were fiscal and monetary policy appropriate 
given the state of the economy? 
The difficulty in examining stabilization policy in the postwar period stems from 
the fact that there is no single fiscal or monetary policy measure that adequately re-
flects discretionary policy changes enacted by policy-makers. For example, the bud-
get deficit, often used as a fiscal policy measure, may expand or contract because of 
changes in the level of economic activity without any deliberate intervention from 
policy-makers. The full employment budget surplus or deficit is a better reflection 
of discretionary fiscal policy. However, this measure is also problematic. According 
to Alan S. Blinder and Robert M. Solow, “Since the FES fails to weight tax receipts 
by the MPC [marginal propensity to consume], it is impossible to associate a given 
change in the FES with a specific change in income; it depends upon how the change 
is apportioned between taxes and spending.”13 
Conventional measures of monetary policy are insufficient as well. The growth 
rate in the money supply, for example, is inappropriate because changes in the money 
supply reflect policy as well as non-policy influences.14 That is, the money supply 
may fluctuate because of changes in the lending behavior of banks or the public’s 
holding of currency. 
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To examine economic policy in the postwar period, impact measures of fiscal and 
monetary policy are presented.15 These impact measures are derived using a mac-
roeconometric model to estimate the impact of changes in fiscal or monetary policy 
in a given year on real GNP four quarters later.16 The macroeconometric model is 
used to compare the simulated real GNP with the actual changes in policy against 
the simulated real GNP without the actual changes in policy that occurred in a partic-
ular quarter to determine the degree to which policy changes were expansionary or 
contractionary.17 
The fiscal policy impact measure is obtained by comparing the simulated real 
GNP with the actual fiscal policy changes that occurred, “Y”, against simulated real 
GNP without the changes in fiscal policy, “Y*”. Therefore, the fiscal policy impact 
measure in time “t” on real GNP “Y” in period “t + j” is: 
F jy(t) = Yt + j – Y*t + j      j ≥ 0
The ten fiscal policy variables held constant in the “Y*” simulation include: real 
federal purchases of goods, personal income tax rate, profit tax rate, indirect business 
tax rate, employee social security tax rate, employer social security tax rate, civilian 
jobs, military jobs, transfer payments to households, and grants-in-aid to state and lo-
cal governments.18 Clearly, most of the variables measure discretionary changes in 
fiscal policy. The primary exception is transfer payments to households, which has a 
highly cyclical component. 
The monetary policy impact measures are derived in a similar fashion by compar-
ing stimulated real GNP with the actual monetary policy changes that occurred, “Y”, 
against simulated real GNP without the changes in monetary policy, ”Y*”. The mone-
tary policy impact measure in time “t” on real GNP “Y” in period “t + j” is thus: 
Mjy(t) = Yt + j – Y*t + j      j ≥ 0
The three monetary policy variables held constant in each quarter are the dis-
count rate, the reserve ratio, and non-borrowed reserves. 
Fiscal Policy
The average quarterly fiscal policy impact measures for each year from 1956 to 
1984 appear in Table I.19 These figures indicate, for example, that fiscal policy in 1957 
was, on average, expansionary—increasing simulated real GNP by $2.52 billion per 
quarter. In contrast, fiscal policy in 1959 was contractionary—decreasing simulated 
real GNP an average $2.35 billion per quarter. 
A brief examination of the fiscal policy impact measures indicates that the impact 
of fiscal policy has increased over time, adding more to simulated real GNP in the 
1970s and 1980s than in the late 1950s and 1960s. The most expansionary fiscal pol-
icy occurred in 1982, when changes in fiscal policy increased simulated real GNP by 
an average $13.23 billion per quarter. The most contractionary fiscal policy occurred 
in 1969 when Richard Nixon entered office and embarked upon a policy of “gradu-
alism” to reduce inflation. Fiscal policy changes in that year reduced simulated real 
GNP an average $2.62 billion per quarter. 
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Table 1. Average Quarterly Fiscal Policy Impact Measures on Real GNP.*
                Year Quarterly Average Year Quarterly Average
 1956 $ 0.14 1971 $ 1.28
 1957 2.52 1972 1.58
 1958 3.88 1973 2.01
 1959 –2.35 1974 5.76
 1960 0.53 1975 7.60
 1961 3.25 1976 1.85
 1962 2.40 1977 4.38
 1963 –0.35 1978 1.87
 1964 –0.68 1979 5.43
 1965 4.30 1980 4.90
 1966 6.29 1981 6.84
 1967 4.36 1982 13.23
 1968 –0.41 1983 2.46
 1969 –2.62 1984 8.04
 1970 2.18 
* Four quarter time horizon in billions of 1972 dollars. 
This increase in the expansionary impact of fiscal policy in the postwar period 
can also be demonstrated by examining the mean of the quarterly fiscal policy impact 
measures by presidential administration. According to Table 2, the mean value of the 
quarterly impact measure during the second Eisenhower Administration was $1.15 
billion. The mean value of the fiscal policy impact measures increased throughout the 
1960s from $1.77 billion in the Kennedy years to $2.77 billion in the Johnson years. 
The mean value then fell rather dramatically in the first Nixon Administration to $.88 
billion. After 1970, the means increased to $5.07 billion in the Ford years, $4.14 billion 
during the Carter years, and $6.41 billion in the first Reagan Administration. 
The figures in Table 2 allow us to compare fiscal policy during the various post-
war presidential periods. Examination of the means indicates that the fiscal stimulus 
of the Carter years was on average less than either the Ford years before or the Rea-
gan years to follow. Although the Ford years were impacted by the recession of 1974–
75 and the Reagan years impacted by the 1981–82 recession, the means indicate that 
the Carter years were not characterized by extreme fiscal expansion. 
Table 2. Summary Statistics of the Fiscal Policy Impact Measures.
Presidential                     Mean         Standard        Coefficient        Deviation
Administration               Value         Deviation      of Variation      from Trend
Eisenhower $ 1.15 3.66 3.18 .54
Kennedy 1.77 2.93 1.66 .40
Johnson 2.77 4.98 1.80 .52
Nixon .88 3.61 4.10 –2.46
Ford 5.07 13.21 2.61 .85
Carter 4.14 4.48 1.08 –.11
Reagan 6.41 9.83 1.53 1.77
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Further evidence is gained by examining the difference between the average an-
nual fiscal policy impact measures and the computed trend value of the fiscal policy 
measures for each presidential term. These data indicate that the Reagan years pro-
duced fiscal policy changes well above the trend expansion. The Ford years also pro-
duced fiscal policy changes above the trend growth as did the Eisenhower, Kennedy, 
and Johnson years. Most interesting, however, are the Carter years which show that 
fiscal policy changes were actually below the trend growth in fiscal policy. That is, 
while fiscal policy has become increasingly expansionary in its impact on real GNP, 
fiscal expansion during the Carter years was less than might be expected. 
Examination of the means gives us some indication of the central tendency of the 
fiscal measures or the average values of the fiscal policy measures by presidential ad-
ministration. However, we can also evaluate fiscal performance by obtaining some 
measure of the relative variability of the impact measures. This will allow us to deter-
mine the stability of fiscal policy. 
The standard deviation is a common measurement of variability. However, be-
cause the means in Table 2 vary considerably, a better measurement of relative vari-
ability is the coefficient of variation, which is obtained by dividing the standard devi-
ation by the mean.20 The coefficient of variation for the various presidential terms is 
also reported in Table 2. 
These data reveal some interesting characteristics of fiscal policy in the postwar 
period. Although the Nixon years had the lowest mean value in fiscal policy impact 
measures, the coefficient of variation was highest during those years. Thus, while fis-
cal policy during the Nixon years appears on average to be quite moderate in its ex-
pansionary impact, it was highly variable and subject to wide swings. Accounting for 
this volatility was the contractionary policy stance taken early on in an effort to cool 
inflation followed by the expansionary fiscal policy pursued before the 1972 presi-
dential election.21 
Also interesting is the coefficient of variation for the second Eisenhower Admin-
istration, which was second in magnitude only to the Nixon years. This high value 
emanates from the expansionary policies pursued during 1957 and 1958 followed 
by the contractionary policies in 1959 and early 1960. The direction of fiscal policy 
during the second Eisenhower Administration provides an interesting contrast to 
the Nixon years. While both are highly variable, Nixon’s fiscal policy is consistent 
with the vote maximizing president who intends to engage in contractionary pol-
icies early in his administration in an effort to reduce inflation only to engage in 
expansionary policies before the presidential election in an effort to benefit from a 
booming economy at election time.22 In contrast, fiscal policy during the Eisenhower 
years, which had been expansionary in 1957 and 1958, became highly contractionary 
in 1959 and 1960. Eisenhower’s policies before the 1960 presidential election were 
certainly not consistent with vote maximizing behavior, and may have contributed 
to Nixon’s defeat.23 
Although Carter and Eisenhower were similar in ranking of their overall eco-
nomic performance, the data presented here indicate that fiscal policy during the 
Carter years was much more stable and less subject to wide variation than that of the 
second Eisenhower Administration. Moreover, fiscal policy during the Carter years 
f i s c a l  p o l i c y ,  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y ,  a n d  t h e  c a r t e r  p r e s i d e n c y    705
stands out as the most stable of any of the presidential administrations evaluated, 
with the lowest coefficient of variation. These data belie the perception of “zigzag 
policies” pursued during the Carter years. Rather than being the most erratic, fiscal 
policy during the Carter years was actually the most stable of any postwar presiden-
tial term. 
Monetary Policy
The average quarterly monetary policy impact measures for each year are re-
ported in Table 3. These findings indicate that changes in monetary policy exert a 
larger influence on real GNP in general than do fiscal policy changes. For example, 
the largest average expansion in monetary policy occurred in 1973 when changes in 
monetary policy increased simulated real GNP by an average of $27.89 billion per 
quarter. In contrast, the largest annual fiscal policy expansion occurred in 1982 when 
fiscal policy changes increased simulated real GNP $13.23 billion per quarter. 
The mean values of the monetary policy impact measures reported in Table 4 also 
indicate that monetary policy changes exerted a larger expansionary impact on real 
Table 3. Average Quarterly Monetary Policy Impact Measures on Real GNP.*
                       Year         Quarterly Average            Year Quarterly Average
 1956 $ 2.10 1971 $11.62
 1957 5.38 1972 7.45
 1958 14.01 1973 27.89
 1959 3.11 1974 2.58
 1960 5.49 1975 5.55
 1961 3.89 1976 10.38
 1962 4.66 1977 12.87
 1963 2.29 1978 6.18
 1964 6.04 1979 8.02
 1965 6.09 1980 1.62
 1966 7.28 1981 4.92
 1967 11.66 1982 16.46
 1968 10.83 1983 8,07
 1969 3.83 1984 21.87
 1970 7.29  
* Four quarter time horizon in billions of 1972 dollars. 
Table 4. Summary Statistics of the Monetary Policy Impact Measures.
Presidential                 Mean            Standard         Coefficient        Deviation
Administration           Value            Deviation       of Variation      from Trend
Eisenhower $ 6.88 9.66 1.40 1.57
Kennedy 3.61 10.84 3.00 –2.50
Johnson 8.82 12.68 1.44 1.11
Nixon 10.10 16.33 1.62 3.11
Ford 6,17 21.22 3.44 –3.31
Carter 7.17 20.98 2.93 –3.18
Reagan 12.23 25.54 2.09 1.50
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GNP than did fiscal policy changes. Moreover, monetary policy in the first Reagan 
Administration exerted the largest average expansionary influence on real GNP with 
a mean of $12.23 billion, followed by the Nixon years with a mean of $10.10 billion, 
and the Johnson years with a mean of $8.82 billion. The Carter years, with a mean of 
$7.17, were similar to the Eisenhower and Ford years, while the Kennedy years show 
the lowest mean value of $3.61 billion. Monetary policy during the Carter years was 
not as expansionary on average as either the Nixon or Johnson years before or the 
Reagan years to follow. 
Further evidence of the relatively restrained nature of monetary policy during 
the Carter years is gained by examining the difference between the average annual 
monetary policy impact measures and the computed trend value for each presiden-
tial term. These data indicate that the Nixon, Eisenhower, Reagan, and Johnson years 
produced monetary policy changes above the trend expansion. In contrast, the Ford, 
Carter, and Kennedy years reflect monetary policy expansion below the trend expan-
sion with both the Carter and the Ford years well below the trend. 
If monetary policy was on average less expansionary in the Carter years than in 
other recent years, it was nonetheless highly volatile. The coefficient of variation in-
dicates that monetary policy was more erratic in the Carter years than it was during 
either the Reagan, Nixon, Johnson, or Eisenhower years. Only during the Ford and 
Kennedy years was monetary policy more erratic. Moreover, the figures suggest that 
monetary policy since the 1970s has been subject to wider swings than was monetary 
policy in the 1950s and 1960s. 
While examination of the means and the coefficients of variation of the fiscal and 
monetary policy impact measures allows us to compare certain characteristics of pol-
icy changes during the Carter years with other postwar presidents, we need finally to 
examine these changes in the context of the economic environment of the late 1970s. 
How appropriate was fiscal and monetary policy during the Carter years and what 
policy direction did Carter provide in the late 1970s? 
President Carter as Manager of Prosperity
When Jimmy Carter entered the White House in 1977 the economy was still re-
covering from what at that time was the worst recession since the Great Depression. 
The recovery, however, was not dramatic. Although real GNP expanded at a 4.9 per-
cent annual rate in 1976, much of the expansion occurred early in the year and the 
recovery appeared to be waning as voters went to the polls in November.24 Unem-
ployment, which was down from its recessionary high of 9.2 percent, remained virtu-
ally flat throughout 1976, fluctuating between 7.7 and 7.8 percent.25 Inflation, too, had 
moderated. After reaching a high of 10.8 percent in the first quarter 1975, it had fallen 
to 5.4 percent by the fourth quarter 1976.26 
President Carter was not out of step with public opinion when he declared early 
on that reducing unemployment should be a high priority. Although public opinion 
polls indicated that Americans continued to express a strong concern about inflation 
throughout 1976, unemployment was increasingly perceived to be important from 
1976 to 1977. According to Gallup Poll data, unemployment was ranked as the most 
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important problem facing the country by 23 percent of those polled in February 1976, 
31 percent in November 1976, and 39 percent in April 1977.27 
Like most postwar presidents, Carter also expressed a perfunctory desire to bal-
ance the budget. However, growth and employment concerns clearly predominated. 
To reduce the relatively high unemployment rate. Carter proposed a reduction in per-
sonal and business taxes for 1977 totaling $12.5 billion and expansion in public works 
and job training programs.28 Although the original tax reduction was not passed, an-
other fiscal stimulus package was enacted that included some minor tax reductions 
and employment programs.29 
As the fiscal policy impact measures developed earlier indicate, fiscal policy was 
moderately expansionary in 1977. Fiscal policy changes in that year expanded simu-
lated real GNP an average of $4.38 billion per quarter, only slightly below the trend 
growth of $4.66 billion. This continued expansion in fiscal policy was also reflected 
in the budget for 1977 which, ultimately, was no more expansionary than the budget 
proposed by former President Ford.30 
By early 1978, however, growing inflation, which had increased to 10.7 percent 
in the second quarter 1978, and falling unemployment led to an increased desire to 
reduce the fiscal stimulus. The President proposed that tax cuts effective October 1, 
1978, be delayed until January 1, 1979, and reduced from $25 billion to $20 billion.31 
As the annual fiscal policy impact measures show, fiscal policy became more contrac-
tionary in early 1978. Fiscal policy changes increased simulated real GNP by an av-
erage of only $1.87 billion per quarter in 1978—an expansion well below the trend 
growth of $4.88 billion. 
The 1979 Economic Report of the President reflected the increasing concern for in-
flation. Although the report states, “We will not try to wring inflation out of our eco-
nomic system by pursuing policies designed to bring about a recession,” fiscal pol-
icy remained contractionary into early 1979.32 While the annual average fiscal policy 
impact measure for 1979 expanded simulated real GNP by $5.43 billion, most of the 
more expansionary policies took place in the third and fourth quarters. Examination 
of the full employment budget indicates that the budget went from a deficit of $11.6 
billion in 1978 to a surplus of $9.8 billion in fiscal 1979.33 
Along with contractionary fiscal policy, Carter implemented a program of “vol-
untary wage and price standards” to fight inflation. From the beginning, the stan-
dards were criticized by everyone from Arthur Burns, Chairman of the Federal Re-
serve in the early years of the Carter Presidency, to labor leaders, who feared that 
business and not labor would benefit from the guidelines.34 Moreover, the public, 
who increasingly saw inflation rather than unemployment as the most important 
problem facing the country and favored wage and price controls to combat inflation, 
viewed guidelines as a weak and ineffective solution.35 
While the business community and Congress talked about wage and price con-
trols, Carter himself did not pursue them. The business community was generally op-
posed to controls in the early years of Carter’s term, although some business leaders, 
such as Henry Kaufman, began to call for controls in the spring of 1980.36 Members of 
Congress, however, remained divided on the issue of controls and never authorized 
the President to impose them.37 
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The opposition to controls stemmed, in part, from the belief that controls would 
not be effective in stopping inflation because much of the inflationary pressure was 
the result of oil price increases imposed by OPEC. While it is no doubt true that the 
OPEC doubling of oil prices in 1979 contributed significantly to the rising inflation in 
1979 and 1980, the belief that controls would be ineffective was not the only constraint 
acting upon the President. Carter was also constrained in using wage and price con-
trols because of his domestic policy of deregulation. This policy of deregulating the 
airlines, financial institutions, and energy prices would have been widely inconsis-
tent with the imposition of wage and price controls. For a president who was increas-
ingly perceived as indecisive and capable of providing only weak leadership, such 
inconsistency was not to be cultivated.38 
If Carter was unwilling to take strong or extreme steps to deal with the growing 
inflation through fiscal or incomes policies, he was willing to take definitive steps to 
restore confidence in the dollar and provide monetary restraint to control inflation. 
Monetary policy, which had been quite expansionary in 1977 and moderately accom-
modating in 1978 and early 1979, turned contractionary in late 1979 and early 1980. 
It was at this time that Carter replaced G. William Miller with a known conservative, 
Paul Volcker, as Chairman of the Federal Reserve.39 While Miller opposed dramatic 
changes in monetary policy as late as April 1979, Volcker favored a more activist ap-
proach and soon announced his intentions to fight inflation with contractionary mon-
etary policy. 
Perhaps over-anxious to wrench inflation from the system, Volcker’s policies 
in the next six months exerted the largest contractionary influence on estimated 
real GNP of any period since 1956. The monetary policy impact measures indicate 
that monetary policy in the fourth quarter 1979 and the first quarter 1980 together 
reduced simulated real GNP by a total of $28 billion. As a result of this contrac-
tionary monetary policy, actual real GNP declined significantly in the second and 
third quarters of 1980. As Gerald Epstein points out, “Between April and June, real 
GNP fell at an annual rate of almost 10 percent, the largest quarterly decline on 
record.”40 
After the massive contraction in late 1979 and early 1980, monetary policy be-
came highly expansionary in mid-1980. The monetary policy impact measures in the 
second and third quarters 1980 indicate that monetary policy exerted the largest ex-
pansionary impact on estimated real GNP of any two consecutive quarters since 1956. 
This expansion was, of course, short lived, and was followed by a full percentage 
point increase in the discount rate just six weeks before the election. The monetary 
policy impact measure for the fourth quarter 1980 was the most contractionary of any 
measure in the entire period from 1956 to 1984. 
In the midst of such tremendous fluctuations in monetary policy, Carter contin-
ued to support a more expansionary fiscal policy. In August 1980 Carter announced 
his “Economic Renewal Program,” an attempt to stimulate the economy through a 
partnership between the private and the governmental sectors. The act provided gov-
ernmental support to deal with economic dislocation, lower corporate taxes to stim-
ulate investment spending, and adjustments to the income tax structure.41 As the fis-
cal policy impact measures indicate, however, fiscal policy in 1980 was not strongly 
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expansionary. Changes in fiscal policy increased estimated real GNP only $4.9 billion 
in 1980, an amount below the trend growth of $5.32 billion. This, of course, was not 
enough to compensate for the severely contractionary monetary policy enacted by 
the Federal Reserve. 
Conclusion 
In April 1980 Democrat Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., in almost utter disbelief that 
Carter would be renominated after four years of what he perceived to be incompe-
tence, asked, “Have we turned into a nation of masochists?”42 Schlesinger’s comment 
reflected the prevailing view that the Carter years were a period of economic malaise. 
While economic policy-making is, in the end, the result of myriad forces, it was the 
Carter Presidency that became associated with indecision and mismanagement. 
However, upon examination, fiscal policy during the Carter years appears to have 
been moderate, in the sense that it did not produce large swings in output or un-
employment, and appropriate in terms of conventional countercyclical policy. When 
President Carter took office, the unemployment rate was above 7 percent—an unusu-
ally high rate for an expansionary period. The policy response was moderate expan-
sion to reduce unemployment. This policy of moderate expansion put only marginal 
upward pressure on prices from 1977 to 1979 until oil price increases began to be felt. 
In response to the increase in inflation, fiscal policy became contractionary. However, 
when the highly contractionary monetary policy threatened to produce a protracted 
recession in 1980, a more expansionary fiscal policy was pursued. 
While fiscal policy was unusually consistent, monetary policy was highly erratic. 
The evidence presented here suggests that unusually erratic monetary policy sub-
stantially impacted popular perceptions of the Carter presidency. Because Carter ap-
pointed Volcker as Chairman of the Federal Reserve, he must share partial blame for 
the volatile economic performance late in his term. However, in the uneasy relation-
ship that exists between the Federal Reserve and the chief executive, such blame is of-
ten misplaced. For his part, the President did call for more expansionary monetary 
policy late in his term, but to no avail. 
In general, the economic policies of the Carter Administration are best viewed 
as a modern tragedy of sorts and provide us with an important example of the po-
tential conflict between presidential self-interest and the public good. Vote maxi-
mizing presidents have an incentive to engage in contractionary policies early in 
their terms to reduce inflation then engage in expansionary policies before the pres-
idential election to reduce unemployment and reap the electoral rewards of an ex-
panding economy. President Carter chose not to increase an already high rate of 
unemployment early in his Administration and due to external events was forced 
to embrace an appropriate, if ill-timed, contractionary policy stance to fight infla-
tion before the 1980 election. Carter’s policies were economically appropriate, but 
politically disastrous. 
In a very fundamental sense, Carter was more like Roosevelt than Hoover. Just as 
Roosevelt has been criticized for trying what was acceptable rather than what would 
work. Carter too failed to provide a creative policy response to his own economic cri-
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sis—the supply side shocks of 1979 and 1980. In the end Carter tried what was accept-
able rather than what might have worked. Rather than enacting an incomes policy to 
fight inflation, Carter preached the gospel of fiscal discipline and monetary conser-
vatism. In Carter’s own words, his policies involved “costs . . . They involve pain . . . 
[but] with proper discipline we will prevail in our fight against inflation.”43 This par-
ticular sermon was not, however, what the American public wanted to hear. 
Ann Mari May would like to thank anonymous reviewers from Presidential Studies Quarterly for their help-
ful comments on an earlier draft of this article. 
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